


EA-18G Growler

EA-18G · Navy · Boeing

+86% \$8.4B (2003) → \$15.7B (2015)



Dashed = promised baseline · solid = actual estimate · shaded = growth

BASLINE
\$8.4B (2003)

COST GROWTH
+86%

UNITS
90 → 160

UNIT-COST CHANGE
+5%

QUANTITY EFFECT
+\$6.6B

CONFIDENCE
high · reconciled

CURRENT ESTIMATE
\$15.7B (2015)

COST BASIS
TY

QUANTITY CHANGE
+78%

SCHEDULE SLIP
0 yr

UNIT-COST EFFECT
+\$701M

IOC
2009 (planned) → 2009

ASSESSMENT

The Growler's +86% bought 70 MORE jets, not more expensive ones: program unit cost moved ~5% in then-year terms over twelve years, and IOC hit in 2009 — the year it was baselined. The cleanest quantity-growth case in the portfolio; production ended FY2016 at 160 aircraft.

SOURCE

EA-18G SAR Dec 2015 (16-F-0402 DOC 51), SAR Baseline History p.26 — then-year \$M: Nov 2003 development estimate \$8,421.6M / 90 aircraft → Jul 2007 production estimate \$8,636.4M / 84 → current \$15,672.4M / 160; PAUC \$93.6M → \$98.0M TY (+4.7%). BY2004\$ pair pp.12-13: \$7,530.8M / 84 → \$13,186.9M / 160. No Nunn-McCurdy breaches, either baseline; cost variance decomposition attributes the growth to quantity (+\$4.2B BY2004\$).