


JDAM

JDAM · Air Force · Boeing

+300% \$2.3B (2001) → \$9.2B (2018)



BASLINE
\$2.3B (2001)
COST GROWTH
+300%
UNITS
89065 → 470656
UNIT-COST CHANGE
-24%
QUANTITY EFFECT
+\$9.9B
CONFIDENCE
high · reconciled

CURRENT ESTIMATE
\$9.2B (2018)
COST BASIS
BY
QUANTITY CHANGE
+428%
SCHEDULE SLIP
+1 yr
UNIT-COST EFFECT
-\$2.9B
IOC
2000 (planned, F/A-18) → 2001

ASSESSMENT

The total quadrupled in constant dollars — and that is the GOOD story: the buy grew from 89,000 tail kits to 471,000 while cost per kit FELL (~\$25.8k → ~\$19.6k BY1995\$); GAO's quantity-adjusted measure shows an 87% cost reduction since baseline. Cost-growth headlines without quantities would get this one exactly backwards.

SOURCE

JDAM SAR Dec 2018 (19-F-1098 DOC 46), Cost Summary p.18 (BY1995\$: Mar 2001 production APB \$2,300.3M → current \$9,211.5M; TY \$2,606.7M → \$12,529.4M) + Total Quantity p.19 (89,065 → 470,656 tail kits). Verified against the DoD Dec 2018 comprehensive SAR summary table. [GAO-19-336SP](#) Obs. 6 + App. VII Table 22: quantity-adjusted cost REDUCTION of \$3.35B (-87%). No Nunn-McCurdy breaches, either baseline.